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In this paper we solve an N 2 N players di®erential game with log-
arithmic objective functions. The optimization problem considered here
is based on the Uzawa Lucas model of endogenous growth. Agents have
logarithmic preferences and own two capital stocks. Since the number of
players is an arbitrary ¯xed number N 2 N the model's solution is more
realistic than the idealized concepts of the social planer or the competitive
equilibrium. We show that the symmetric Nash equilibrium is completely
described by the solution to one single ordinary di®erential equation. The
numerical results imply that the in°uence of the externality along the bal-
anced growth path vanishes rapidly as the number of players increases.
O® the steady state the externality is of great importance even for a large
number of players.
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11 Introduction
This paper studies an N players di®erential game that is based on the Uzawa
(1965) and Lucas (1988) model of endogenous growth. Each player owns a goods
producing ¯rm and has access to educational services. The game's time horizon
is in¯nite and the number of players is ¯xed. The goods sector technology is
Cobb-Douglas in human and physical capital while the schooling technology is
linear in human capital only. At the outset of the game, the players' initial
endowments are identical and their task is to choose simultaneously the op-
timal consumption and the optimal allocation of human capital between the
two sectors. Since the goods sector productivity is in°uenced by the economy-
wide average level of human capital, the representative player has to know the
decisions of his co-players in order to determine optimally his own controls.
Furthermore, the game is symmetric in the players' constraints and their objec-
tive functions. These facts motivate us to restrict our search for a solution to
symmetric Nash equilibria.
By generalizing the solution method introduced in Bethmann and Rei¼
(2004) we present the game's open-loop solution. The main idea is to exploit
the model's inherent homogeneity (cf. Caball¶ e and Santos, 1993) in order to
reduce the complexity of the optimization problem. This is done by using the
geometric mean when de¯ning the economy-wide average level of human capital
such that we are able to subsume the information of the relevant state variables
in a weighted product, with the model's inherent homogeneity determining the
respective weights. Following Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1991) we refer to
the result of this transformation as the state-like variable. The multiplicative
structure of this variable together with the logarithmic utility function allows
us to rewrite the value function as the sum of the `value-function-like function'
and expressions representing the in°uence of the human capital stocks of each
single agent on his life-time utility. The introduction of the value-function-like
function then allows us to reduce the complexity of the representative play-
ers Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation to an implicit partial di®erential
equation. In fact we are able to state an explicit solution to this equation.
However, it is the generalization of the unstable solutions to the resulting HJB
equations in the social planer's and the in¯nitely many agents case (cf. Beth-
mann and Rei¼, 2004). Nevertheless, the knowledge of this function allows us to
determine the model's steady state. Using a standard transformation (cf. Bron-
stein and Semendjajew, 1999) we get an equivalent explicit partial di®erential
equation, which can be further reduced to an ordinary di®erential equation by
inserting the symmetric Nash equilibrium condition. Finally, we use the steady
state in order to determine an initial value problem for this ordinary di®erential
equation.
The numerical results show that the number of agents does indeed in°uence
the optimal human capital allocation of the representative agent. However this
in°uence of N decreases very fast. Moreover, the strength of this phenomenon
heavily depends on the degree of the external e®ect of human capital on the
goods sector productivity. In fact we show that both parameters work in op-
2posite directions. An increase in the degree of the external e®ect resembles the
e®ect that a lowering of the number of players has on the outcome of the di®er-
ential game. Although, the conjecture that both e®ects are reciprocal suggests
itself, we show that this only holds for the steady state allocation. O® the bal-
anced growth path the in°uence of number of players also vanishes, the degree
of the external e®ect however is still driving the agents' decisions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
states the di®erential game implied by the players' coupled optimization prob-
lems. Section 4 presents the mathematical solution strategy. Section 5 examines
the numerical results showing the above mentioned antagonistic e®ects of the
two parameters. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains statements that
are omitted in the main paper for clarity of the exposition.
2 The model
We assume a closed economy populated by N 2 N identical and in¯nitely-lived
oligopolists. They are producing a single good and have access to a schooling
sector providing educational services. The representative oligopolist1 A(i), i 2









t is the agent's level of consumption at time t and ½ > 0 is the subjective
discount rate. The logarithmic utility function implies that the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is equal to one. Agents have a ¯xed endowment of time,
which is normalized as a constant °ow of one unit. The variable u
(i)
t denotes the
fraction of time allocated to goods production at time t. The fraction 1 ¡ u
(i)
t
of time is spent in the schooling sector. As agents do not bene¯t from leisure,




t 2 [0;1] (2)




t are the agent's control variables.
Human capital production is determined by a linear technology in human capital
_ h
(i)





where we assume that B is positive. This technology together with constraint
(2) implies that human capital will never shrink, i.e. the growth rate _ h(i) is
non-negative. If we set u
(i)
t equal to zero, we get the potential growth rate of
the oligopolist's human capital stock. If we set u
(i)
t equal to one, a stagnation
of his human capital follows. The schooling technology implies that the realized
1Henceforth we use oligopolist, agent, and player interchangeably.
3marginal and average product are equal to B(1 ¡ u
(i)
t ). Note that we abstract
from depreciation.
The economy's goods supply is given by N identical producers manufactur-
ing a single good. They are using a Cobb-Douglas technology in the two inputs
physical and human capital. The level of human capital utilized in goods pro-
duction equals the total level of the stock of human capital multiplied by the
fraction of time spent in the goods sector at time t. Total factor productivity
A is enhanced by the external e®ect ° of the economy's average stock of human












The parameter ® is the output elasticity of physical capital and we assume
® 2 (0;1). The exponent ° is assumed to be nonnegative. If we set ut equal to
one, we get the potential output of the representative oligopolist. We assume
that the economy-wide average level of human capital is de¯ned by the geometric








Since all agents are homogeneous, the economy's average level of human capital




t = ha;t; 8t ¸ 0: (5)
The oligopolist can either consume or invest his output y
(i)
t , i.e. his budget





t + _ k
(i)
t ; 8t ¸ 0:
The right-hand side describes the spending of the oligopolist's earnings, where
_ k
(i)
t is the rate of change of his physical capital stock k
(i)
t . Since we abstract from
depreciation, this rate corresponds to his net investment in physical capital.
The left-hand side collects the streams of income stemming from the agent's




t . We assume that the
initial values k0 and h0 are strictly positive. Note that by consuming more than
current production it is possible to disinvest in physical capital, i.e. the growth
rate of physical capital turns negative.
Informational assumptions
In order to quantify the in°uence of the external e®ect and of the number of
players on the game's outcome, we compute the model's open-loop equilibrium
strategies. The open-loop equilibrium concept is characterized by the fact that
the agents commit themselves at the outset to entire temporal paths of human
capital allocation and consumption that maximize the discounted utility given
the decision paths of all other agents. The next section discusses the optimiza-
tion problem at hand as a di®erential game.
43 The N-players game
We consider a non-cooperative di®erential game with N 2 N players. The game
extends over the unbounded time interval [0;1). The state of the game at each















++ is the state space of the game. The entries k(i) and h(i) denote
the physical and human capital stocks of agent A(i), i 2 NN, i.e. we denote
player-speci¯c variables and functions by upper indices. Let us de¯ne the set
¹ S as the subset of R2N
++ with elements of the form fz;y;z;y;::;z;yg, where





2 ¹ S ½ R2N
++. At each point in time t 2 [0;1), each





++ 7! [0;1) £ [0;1]jlocally bounded and measurable
ª
:

































These equations hold for all t 2 [0;1) and all i 2 NN. Note that the assumption
(4) allows us to rewrite the term h°
a, which in°uences total factor productivity












where j 6= i is a shortcut and stands for j 2 NN n fig. We assume that agents
make their choices simultaneously and try to solve the following dynamic op-
















































t ; 8t ¸ 0;
k
(i)
t ¸ 0 and h
(i)
t ¸ 0; 8t ¸ 0:
Since for positive ° all these optimization problems are coupled via the values of
the individual human capital stocks h(j), we interpret this optimization problem
as a multiple players' non-cooperative game ¡(t;st). Note that the above DOPs
5are homogeneous in the initial conditions (cf. Bethmann and Rei¼, 2004), a fact
that we will exploit extensively in the next section. The symmetry in the agents'
initial endowments together with the symmetry in preferences and technology
causes us to look for symmetric Nash equilibria. Applying the de¯nition (e.g.
Dockner et al. (2000), Chapter 4) to our game ¡(0; ¹ s0), the policy functions









holds for all feasible controls u(i) and c(i) and for all agents A(i), i 2 NN. In the
following section we assume that agents commit themselves to entire courses
of action at the outset of the game and are not allowed to revise them at any
subsequent date.
4 The open-loop solution
In this section we solve the non-cooperative game under the assumption that
the agents are not allowed to revise their action paths once they have made
their choices, i.e. we consider that agents play open-loop strategies. In Section
4.1 we exploit the game's homogeneity in the initial conditions in order to re-
duce the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation to an implicit partial di®erential
equation. Along the balanced growth path this equation is an implicit di®er-
ential equation and we are able to give an explicit solution which is indeed the
representative agent's value function. However, outside this path the applica-
tion of this function leads to non-feasible controls. In Section 4.2 we start with
the implicit partial di®erential equation describing the solution to our problem.
We de¯ne the symmetric Nash equilbrium and reduce the problem to an initial
value problem for a single explicit ordinary di®erential equation.
4.1 The Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation
The representative agent de¯nes the value function as the solution to his opti-
mization problem:





t dt; ¿ = 1
¡1; ¿ < 1;
where ¿ denotes the stopping time ¿ := infft ¸ 0jkt = 0g. In order to determine
the value function, we write down the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
for the value function V (i) := V (i)(st):































h , and , V
(i)
h(j) denote the partial derivatives with respect to the
agent's own capital stocks k(i) and h(i) and with respect to the other agent's
6human capital stocks h(j). These derivatives can be interpreted as the shadow
prices of relaxing the corresponding constraints. V
(i)
t denotes the partial deriva-
tive with respect to time t. Since the representative agent has no in°uence on
the evolution of his co-players stocks of human capital h(j), it does not matter


























The representative agent chooses the consumption stream such that the marginal
utility is equal to the marginal change of wealth with respect to physical capital.
The optimal allocation of human capital between the two sectors is determined
by the weighted ratio of the marginal changes in goods production and school-
ing due to a marginal shifting of the human capital allocation. The respective
weights are the agent's shadow prices of the corresponding state variable. Since
the value function V (i) is obviously increasing in its arguments, the relation (7)
ensures that the consumption rate is positive. Equally, u(i¤) 2 (0;1) holds,
but u(i¤) > 1 may well occur. For the moment, let us suppose that the controls
(c(i¤);u(i¤)) found above are feasible. We continue with the insertion of our
¯ndings into the HJB equation (6). We obtain:
































The homogeneity in the initial conditions allows us to generalize Mulligan and
Sala-i-Martin's (1991) idea to introduce the representative agent's state-like
variable x
(i)
t and his control-like variable q
(i)
































The evolution of x(i) can be determined by taking the derivative with respect


































We see that the evolution of x
(i)
t is completely described by three groups of
variables. First, by the state-like variable x(i) itself, second by A(i)'s controls
u(i) and q(i), and third by all other agent's human capital allocation decision
paths u
(j)
t with j 6= i. The homogeneity in the initial conditions implies that we








t for any symmetric




0 . The only di®erence is that the consumption
rate ~ c
(i)
t di®ers from c
(i)





























Following Bethmann and Rei¼ (2004) we deduce the symmetric solution from
the value function-like function f(i) with V (i)(¹ st) = f(i)(x(i);t;u
(j)
t ;j 6= i) via
V (i)(¹ st;t;u
(j)
t ;j 6= i) = f(i)(x(i);t;u
(j)












where the semicolon indicates that we restrict the function to given time depen-
dent paths of the other agents' allocations of human capital. The derivatives of
V (i) with respect to the agent's capital stocks k(i) and h(i), with respect to the
other agents' human capital stocks h(j) with j 6= i, and with respect to time






























































@t . Thus the function f(i) determines deci-
sively the shadow values of the two private production factors and of the other
agent's stocks of human capital. The introduction of f(i) allows us to rewrite

























Let ua;t denote the arithmetic mean of all other agents A(j), j 6= i, decisions
of allocating their stocks of human capital, i.e. we de¯ne the optimal average









Using this de¯nition and the above ¯rst order necessary conditions we ¯rst
determine the balanced growth path solution, where the state-like variable x(i)
and the controls q(i) and u(i) remain constant over time. In this case the optimal
8average human capital allocation must also be a constant in the interval [0;1],
i.e. u¤
a;t = u¤
a 2 [0;1] for all t ¸ 0. Then the HJB-equation is time independent
such that f
(i)



















































Note, that we have reduced the HJB equation along the balanced growth path
to an implicit di®erential equation, where ' is a strictly positive constant. We










½ ln(x(i) + '): (13)
Indeed, we have f
(i)
















































The insertion of these ¯ndings into the dynamics equation (10) for the state-like




















A search for the steady states of x(i) shows that on the positive axis _ x
(i)
t only



















Linearizing the right hand side of equation (10) at x(i) = x
(i)













; with ½ + a' > 0:
Therefore we infer that f(i) yields the unstable solution branch in the phase
diagram. Unfortunately, an analytic expression for the stable solution branch


















We stress that f(i) determines u
(i¤)
ss independently of u¤
a such that the decen-
tralized steady state is unique.
94.2 The symmetric Nash equilibrium
By symmetry, u(i¤) = u¤ and c(i¤) = c¤ do not depend on the agent A(i) and in
particular the average human capital allocation rule satis¯es ua = u(i¤). Hence,
the agent's lifetime utility U(i) only depends on his own controls u(i) and c(i)
and on the average decision rule u¤
a concerning the optimal allocation of human















holds for all feasible controls (ut)t¸0 and (ct)t¸0. Note that from now on we
drop the superscript (i) in the notation. Furthermore, we restrict our attention











































Consequently, p(x;t) := fx(x;t) solves the partial di®erential equation:
p = G(t)
x + G(t)
p px + G
(t)
d pt;














































d (x;p;d) = 1
½:
Note that the dynamics equation (10) for the state-like variable xt together with
the restated ¯rst order necessary conditions (11) and (12) imply that _ xt = ½G
(t)
p
holds along the optimal control path. From economic theory we immediately
infer that xt converges monotonically to the steady state xss such that _ xt =
½G
(t)
p 6= 0 holds o® the balanced growth path. Denoting the inverse function







t we thus infer















where G(t) means of course G(t(x)) along the solution path. There we know
from the Nash condition that ua;t = u¤(xt) holds which we can ¯nally insert to




































Here the notation '(p;x) re°ects that 't depends on u(p;x) which is itself











Hence the optimal average decision rule u¤
a;t is replaced by (16) thereby stressing
that the agents commit themselves to time dependent control paths (ut)t¸0 at
the outset of the game. The di®erential equation is now explicit with
~ p0 =
~ p ¡ Gx
Gp
:
Using the fact that q = p¡1 and hence q0 = ¡p¡2p0 holds we can rewrite this
equation in terms of the optimal control-like variable such that the following










































and K (xss;q(xss)) = L(xss;q(xss)) = 0:





This leads us to a quadratic equation in q0(xss), one solution of which we already
know from W, namely q0(xss) = ½. Therefore, there exists exactly one other


















The Appendix states some intermediate results that we obtained when deter-
mining this expression. Note that only a simple initial value problem remains
to be solved, which is done in next section.


























Figure 1: Phase diagrams for q(x) with ° = 0:1 and ° = 0:5.
Left: 2 players. Right: 1000 players.
5 Numerical results
In this section we discuss the ¯ndings of the preceding section and examine the
in°uence of the number of players and the in°uence of the external e®ect °
on the outcome of the di®erential game which is driven by the human capital
allocation u. In order to do this, we consider the following typical calibration
of the parameter values
A = 1; B = 1
10; ½ = 1
20; and ® = 1
3 : (19)
Figure 1 contains the phase diagrams for the representative players control-like
variable q(x) where we have set the degree of the external e®ect ° equal to 0:1
and to 0:5, respectively. The left diagram displays the duopoly solution and the
right diagram refers to the case with 1000 players. The linear lines are derived
from the unstable solution (13) to the HJB-equation with the parameter ua
set equal to its steady state value (15). The concave lines that start in the
respective origin are the optimal controls q derived from the true value function
V , that is the numerical solution of the initial value problem given in equations
(17) and (18). Both the stable and the unstable function meet in the respective
saddle point (xss;qss). Note, that the duopolist's relatively high valuation of
human capital leads to lower steady-state values of x in the left diagram than
the corresponding steady states in the right diagram where N = 1000 holds. On
the other hand, if ° increases, we observe a shifting of the steady state to the
left, i.e. the N-e®ect and the °-e®ect work in opposite directions. Consequently,
in cases with low ° or with a high number of players N, the players' in°uence
on the average productivity is very small such that the steady-state proportion
of consumption to the physical capital stock is lower than the two players case
or in the case where ° is higher. The pictures show these proportions as the
angles between the x-axis and the straight line between the steady state and
the origin.
Figure 2 shows the optimal human capital allocation u in the (x;°) space







































Figure 2: Optimal time share u in (x;°) space.
Left: 2 players. Right: 1000 players.
the case with N = 1000. The black lines correspond to the respective steady-
state values uss. Since the duopolist has more in°uence on the evolution of the
average human capital stock, his valuation of human capital is higher than that
of the representative oligopolist in the N = 1000 players game. This explains
why for positive ° the duopolist's allocation of human capital to the goods
sector is always smaller than the corresponding value of u in the right part. For
small values of x and °, they both are about to set u larger than one. Keeping
° ¯xed, the fraction of time allocated to goods production decreases when x
increases. This observation can be rationalized as follows. A high value of x
indicates that the economy's endowment of human capital is relatively low. This
leads to high marginal returns of human capital in goods production. Arbitrage
reasoning implies that the realized marginal productivity of human capital in
the schooling sector must also be relatively high2. Hence a comparatively high
fraction of human capital is attracted by the schooling sector. This explains the
relatively low value of u. Since the marginal returns of human capital in goods
production and ° are positively related, this reasoning can also explain the
negative slope of the surface with respect to °. Since an increase in the number
of players causes the in°uence of a single player on the average level of human
capital to be declining, we observe for the optimal human capital allocation that
u(x) decreases in N. In this sense considering di®erent N's means a rescalation
of the °-axis, i.e. the surface is stretched like a rubber blanket if the number N
increases (see also Figure 5 in the Appendix). The following two ¯gures examine
the interplay of ° and N in detail.
Figure 3 shows the optimal human capital allocation u depending on the
number of players N. The left diagram displays the respective steady state
values. The case N = 1 corresponds to the social planer's solution. Since the
social returns are taken into account by the planner, his steady state valuation
of human capital is higher than that of an arbitrary oligopolist. This explains
2The opportunity costs of schooling are also determined by the shadow values of the rep-
resentative agent's capital stocks.







































Optimal time share u with respect to N.
Left: Steady state uss. Right: Optimal choice
u(xce
ss).
why for positive ° the planner's allocation of human capital to the goods sector
is smaller than the corresponding value of u in cases where N is bigger than
one. A similar argument holds for arbitrary oligopolies with N and N0 players,
where N < N0. The higher marginal returns of the representative players human
capital in the N players case lead to a lower steady state value of u compared to
the N0 players case. Keeping these re°ections in mind we now consider optimal
allocations along the transition towards the steady state. The right diagram of
the ¯gure refers to the optimal human capital allocation if the state-like variable
is equal to its competitive equilibrium steady state xce
ss, i.e. in the case where













Since xss is increasing in N we know that the optimal allocation u of the N
players game at this state must be smaller than its respective steady state
u(xce
ss)<u(xss). For increasing values of N two e®ects start to set in. First, the
game's steady state of the state-like variable converges against xce
ss from below.
Second, as mentioned above the representative player's in°uence on the average
human capital stock is shrinking. Both e®ects cause the optimal choice of u(xce
ss)
to increase.
Figure 4 shows the values of u where we consider the state-like variable to
be far away from steady state. In the right part of the ¯gure x = 3xce
ss holds, i.e.
we consider a relative scarcity of human capital. This causes the productivity of
human capital in the goods sector w to be very high, where the representative







If we neglect the respective shadow values for the moment, it follows that the
opportunity costs of schooling are also very high in this case. Then the players
optimal allocation of human capital to the goods sector must be relatively small
in order to match the marginal productivity of human capital in the two sec-




































Figure 4: Optimal time share u(x) with respect to N.
Left: For x = 3xce
ss. Right: For x = 1=3xce
ss.
tors. Clearly, this e®ect is the more distinct the bigger the parameter °, i.e. the
higher the marginal productivity of his human capital stock in the goods sector.
In the right part of the ¯gure we consider x = 1=3xce
ss. This corresponds to a
relative scarcity in physical capital thereby implying a relatively low marginal
productivity of human capital. Note, that for large numbers N the optimal
human capital allocation to the goods sector is the bigger the higher the val-
ues of °. This can be rationalized as follows. Let two games be given. In the
¯rst game the parameter ° is bigger than the second game's °. Furthermore,
suppose that the number N is relatively large such that we can neglect the rep-
resentative agent's in°uence on the economy-wide average human capital stock.
If we assume that the average human capital stock in both games grow with
the same rate the representative agent knows that the marginal productivity of
his human capital stock in the next moment will be higher in the case where °
is big. This means that the shadow value of his present stock of human capital
is smaller than in the low ° case. Thereby the shadow values give an incen-
tive for human capital investment in the high ° case. Furthermore, the original
assumption that the average stock of human capital in both cases grow at the
same rate can not be a symmetric Nash equilibrium, at least in one of the two
games considered. We conclude that the average stock of human capital grow
faster in the high ° case.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have derived the open loop solution of a di®erential game with
logarithmic objective functions. The focus on time dependent control paths
and on symmetric Nash equilibria has permitted to solve the di®erential game
for an arbitrary number of players. We have shown that the game's solution
is completely described by an initial value problem for an ordinary di®erential
equation. Since the allocation of human capital between the two production
sectors is crucial for our understanding of the transitional dynamics (cf. Mul-
15ligan and Sala-i-Martin, 1993) we have examined the in°uences of the number
of players N and the degree of the external e®ect ° on the optimal choice of
u. We have shown that both parameters have a decreasing in°uence on the
steady-state allocation. Furthermore, the in°uence of both parameters vanishes
for large N. O® the steady state, the optimal allocation is more sensitive to the
two parameters. Again the importance of N vanishes. However, we show that




Figure 5 shows similar plots as Figure 2 in the main text. The only di®erence
here is that we have set N equal to 1, 3, 10, and 100. We observe that the
surface indeed the optimal human capital allocation u in the (x;°) space as a
surface. It can be seen that the number N of players causes the surface to rise to
the left of the steady state and to part represents the duopoly solution and the














































































Figure 5: Optimal time share u with respect to (x;°).
16The initial value q0(xss)















®½' and uq = uss
½'ss
a :
Let K(q(xss);xss) and L(q(xss);xss) denote the numerator and denominator




½Lq(q(xss);xss) holds for the


























This implies the expression given in equation (18).
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